"Noisy" vs. "Bounded" Leakage

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Attacks on cryptographic schemes exploiting physical hardware quirks.





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power consumption





electromagnetic radiation

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Leakage-resilience: System should remain secure even when adversary is able to mount a wide class of side-channel attacks.

Side-channel attacks can be cheap!



Paul Kocher — Obvious in hindsight: From side-channel attacks to the security challenges ahead Invited talk at CRYPTO/CHES 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6lt7ExN6Kw4

 Wanted better data than timing Bought the cheapest analog oscilloscope at Fry's electronics Resistor from Radio Shack "Science Fair 60 in One Electronic Project Lab"

Instant SPA results, e.g.:

 RSA (squares vs. multiplies, CRT timing...) DES (with branching in C/D shift - really!)



Bounded leakage

The most studied leakage model in theoretical cryptography.

K

n bits long

leakage

 ℓ bits long, $\ell < n$

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Example: keylength n = 512 bits, leakage length $\ell = 256$ bits f can be **any** function with 256-bit output!



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We know many cryptographic schemes with great "bounded leakage-resilience" guarantees.



Real-world leakage

Real-world side-channel attacks produce a lot of data, but it is noisy!



leakage



f(K)

Real-world leakage

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Several different measures of "noise" out there.

- leakage

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Popular noise measure: mutual information between *K* and f(K).



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Open-ended, depends on the noisy leakage model.

THE question

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We would like to find a noisy leakage model that:

1. Can be "simulated" effectively by bounded leakage.

- Does resilience to bounded leakage attacks imply non-trivial resilience to real world side-channel attacks?



Open-ended, depends on the noisy leakage model.

- 1. Can be "simulated" effectively by bounded leakage.
- 2. Captures real-world side-channel attacks with good parameters.

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 - A. Practitioner infers leakage distributions induced by attacks on specific device;
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 - C. Readily derives useful concrete security guarantees.

- Does resilience to bounded leakage attacks imply non-trivial resilience to real world side-channel attacks?



Secret *X*, randomized leakage Z = f(X)

Ideal world



Real world

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statistical distance

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"Low mutual information" is too loose, need to come up with a different measure.



Coming up with another noise measure

- 1. Can be simulated using a small amount of bounded leakage.
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Coming up with another noise measure

(**RECAP**) We would like to find a noisy leakage model that:

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We'll do it backwards... (1) come up with a nice simulator, (2) reverse-engineer the noise measure.



Setting: Want to sample from P, but only have access to i.i.d. samples from Q and Bernoulli random variables.

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Rejection Sampling 101

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- return *L*;
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- $g_{\vec{z}}$ has output length $\log L$
- simulation error = rej. samp. fails $\approx e^{-L/T}$
- Need $P_{Z|X=x}(z) \leq T \cdot P_Z(z)$ for most z







Which noisy leakages are good for rejection sampling?

Hockey-Stick Divergences (generalize statistical distance):

 $SD_t(P; Q) \leq \delta$ if and only if $P(S) \leq 2^t \cdot Q(S) + \delta$ for all sets S.





The (t, δ) -SD-noisy model

Z = f(X) is (t, δ) -SD-noisy leakage from X if $SD_t(P_{XZ}; P_X \otimes P_Z) \le \delta$



Simulation by bounded leakage

For any $\alpha > 0$, (t, δ) -SD-noisy leakage is $(\varepsilon = \delta + \alpha)$ -simulatable from $t + \log \ln(1/\alpha)$ bits of bounded leakage.

Essentially,

 $t \approx$ amount of bounded leakage,

 $\delta \approx$ simulation error.

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• (t, δ) -SD-noisy leakages compose nicely — uses connection to differential privacy





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Thanks!

