



## Pseudo-Entanglement is Necessary for EFI Pairs

Manuel Goulão with David Elkouss

*Portugal Crypto Day* — 13th of December of 2024

# Overview

Introduction

Fundamentals of Cryptography

EFI Pairs are Necessary for Cryptography

Pseudo-Entanglement is Necessary for EFI Pairs

Discussion

# Contents

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- What systems may we *implement*?
- *Perfect encryption*
- All messages are valid: *Zero information!*
- Key as long as the message. . .
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NSA One-Time Pad (Source: Wikimedia)

How to make it practical?

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# Computational Cryptography

- Make *computational* assumptions
- Limit computational resources
- 1. Make problems intricate
- 2. Make *hardness* assumptions
- Security is assumed, not proven

$$b^x = a \pmod{q}$$

Find  $x$

Discrete logarithm problem

AES round  
(Source: Wikimedia)

Used everywhere in the information-world

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
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
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
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
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## Contributions

- Existence of *pseudo-entanglement is necessary for EFI pairs*
- *Constructive result: weakest construction of pseudo-entangled states (not PRSs)*
- *Polynomial amplification of pseudo-entanglement*
- *New candidate for minimal assumption for computational cryptography*
- *Connection between computational hardness/cryptography and physics*



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- Existence of *pseudo-entanglement* is necessary for *EFI* pairs
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
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
# Classical Cryptography

## *Cryptomania*



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## *Minicrypt*



$P \neq NP$


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
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# Quantum Cryptography


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# Quantum Cryptography

*Minicrypt*



# Quantum Cryptography

*Minicrypt*

...

$\Rightarrow$

OWF

PRSG

SKE

OWSG

$\Rightarrow$

EFI pairs

$\Leftrightarrow$

Commit

$\Leftrightarrow$

OT

$\Leftrightarrow$

MPC

Pseudo-entanglement

QKD

## Classical vs. Quantum Cryptography

- Impossibility of many *Information-Theoretic* protocols
- *Classical (computational) cryptography*  $\implies \mathbf{P} \neq \mathbf{NP}$
- *Quantum resources*  $\implies$  weaker Commitments, OT, QKD, ...
- Assume correctness of the *Laws of Physics*
- *New computational world*: Quantum Cryptography, but no Classical Cryptography

How physics and computational hardness relate through cryptography?

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
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
Discussion

# Weaker Primitives

- **One-Way Functions**



- **Pseudo-Random Generator**



## *Pseudo-Random State Generator*


- Efficient gen. (QPT):  $G_n(k) = |\psi_k\rangle$
- Pseudo-random:  $G_n(k)^{\otimes p(n)} \approx_c |H\rangle^{\otimes p(n)}$

OWF  $\implies$  PRSG


PRSG  $\not\Rightarrow$  (oracle red.) OWF

# Weaker Primitives

- **One-Way Functions**



- **Pseudo-Random Generator**



## *Pseudo-Random State Generator*


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
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# EFI (quantum state) Pairs

Mixed  $n$ -qubit states  $\rho_0, \rho_1$

- Efficiently preparable: QPT  $\mathcal{U}_0, \mathcal{U}_1$
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- computationally Indistinguishable:  $\rho_0 \approx_c \rho_1$





EFI Pairs  $\iff$  Commitments  $\iff$  OT  $\iff$  MPC

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



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


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

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Probability ensembles  $X = \{X_n\}_n, Y = \{Y_n\}_n$

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Introduction

Fundamentals of Cryptography

EFI Pairs are Necessary for Cryptography

Pseudo-Entanglement is Necessary for EFI Pairs

Discussion

# Computational Entanglement

## *Entanglement cost*

- Given  $\Phi$ ; use LOCC to prepare  $\rho_{AB}$
- How many Bell pairs do they need?

$$E_C^\varepsilon(\rho_{AB}) = \inf\{n \mid F(\Gamma(\Phi^{\otimes n}), \rho_{AB}) \leq 1 - \varepsilon\}$$

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# EFI Pairs $\implies$ Pseudo-Entanglement

## Construction

EFI pair  $\rho_0, \rho_1$

$$\psi_{AB} = \frac{1}{4} (|\Phi^+\rangle\langle\Phi^+|_{AB} + |\Phi^-\rangle\langle\Phi^-|_{AB}) \otimes (\rho_{0A} + \rho_{1A})$$

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- Unbounded  $A$  distinguishes  $\rho_0, \rho_1$  and tells  $B$
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$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}}(\rho_0, \rho_1) \leq \varepsilon \implies \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}'}(\psi_{AB}, \phi_{AB}) \leq \varepsilon'$$

$$\cdot \begin{cases} \mathcal{D}'(|\Phi^+\rangle\langle\Phi^+| \otimes \rho_0) \text{ or } \mathcal{D}'(|\Phi^-\rangle\langle\Phi^-| \otimes \rho_1) \longrightarrow \psi_{AB}, \phi_{AB} \\ \mathcal{D}'(|\Phi^+\rangle\langle\Phi^+| \otimes \rho_1) \text{ or } \mathcal{D}'(|\Phi^-\rangle\langle\Phi^-| \otimes \rho_0) \longrightarrow \psi_{AB} \end{cases}$$

- Distinguish  $\frac{1}{2}$  the times
- $\mathcal{D}'$  can prepare  $\psi_{AB}$  and  $\phi_{AB}$  locally

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}'}(\psi_{AB}, \phi_{AB}) \leq \frac{1}{2} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}}(\rho_0, \rho_1) < \varepsilon$$

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Proof (amplification)

$$\bar{\psi}_{AB} = \bigotimes_{i=1}^q \psi_{AB}$$

$$\bar{\phi}_{AB} = \bigotimes_{i=1}^q \phi_{AB}$$

Error:

$$\cdot F(\rho^{\otimes q}, \sigma^{\otimes q}) = F(\rho, \sigma)^q \implies (1 - \varepsilon)^q \geq 1 - q\varepsilon$$

Swap:

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# Contents

Introduction

Fundamentals of Cryptography

EFI Pairs are Necessary for Cryptography

Pseudo-Entanglement is Necessary for EFI Pairs

Discussion

## Discussion

- If *pseudo-entanglement* does not exist, then most cryptography is impossible.
- New candidate for a *minimal assumption* necessary for cryptography.
- Connect the properties of the *physical world and efficient computation*.
- ? Candidates for pseudo-entanglement?
- ? Applications of pseudo-entanglement?

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