



## Pseudo-Entanglement is Necessary for EFI Pairs

Manuel Goulão with David Elkouss

*Portugal Crypto Day* — 13th of December of 2024

# Overview

Introduction

Fundamentals of Cryptography

EFI Pairs are Necessary for Cryptography

Pseudo-Entanglement is Necessary for EFI Pairs

Discussion

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*Perfect encryption*

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Key as long as the message. . .

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NSA One-Time Pad (Source: Wikimedia)

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VRETH JPCBU AVUYB JWNKN VLSEL	C	ABCDEFGHIJKLMN	OPQRSTUVWXYZ
PQDTH JLVJ JXPKL HPLGA QZVZY	D	XYZWVUTSRQPON	MKLIJHGFEDCBA
TSUTO ZBNKJ BBNBY HPKPI QZVZ	E	ABCDEFGHIJKLMN	OPQRSTUVWXYZ
ETJVP BRXKR PNTYV YTKAK ATOPN	F	XYZWVUTSRQPON	MKLIJHGFEDCBA
NHCJK PPNBY BNEZH QZVYN CTADB	G	ABCDEFGHIJKLMN	OPQRSTUVWXYZ
YIIUJ TNRRE SHRDE YOVKJ HOCBY	H	XYZWVUTSRQPON	MKLIJHGFEDCBA
-ALOK NHIIN CAIDY RQTKH ZDZMP	I	ABCDEFGHIJKLMN	OPQRSTUVWXYZ
GINDS ECHPE ABBYJ CAYBO IABHU	J	XYZWVUTSRQPON	MKLIJHGFEDCBA
KLZK QZJIN DBRXY BHWVE LPKAT	K	ABCDEFGHIJKLMN	OPQRSTUVWXYZ
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Make *computational* assumptions

Limit computational resources

1. Make problems intricate
2. Make *hardness* assumptions

Security is assumed, not proven

$$b^x = a \pmod{q}$$

Find  $x$

Discrete logarithm problem

AES round  
(Source: Wikimedia)

Used everywhere in the information-world

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
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
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
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
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## Contributions

Existence of *pseudo-entanglement* is necessary for *EFI* pairs

*Constructive result*: weakest construction of pseudo-entangled states (not PRSs)

Polynomial *amplification of pseudo-entanglement*

New candidate for *minimal assumption* for computational cryptography

Connection between *computational hardness/cryptography and physics*



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# Classical Cryptography

## *Cryptomania*

CCA-PKE  $\Rightarrow$  PKE (= OT ( ) MPC  
 )  
 KE

---

## *Minicrypt*

Signatures ( ) OWF ( ) SKE ( ) PRG  
 )  
 Coin flip ( ) Commit

$P \neq NP$

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*Cryptomania*

CCA-PKE      =)

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( =

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( )

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KE

---

*Minicrypt*

Signatures      ( )

OWF

( )

SKE

( )

PRG



Coin flip

( )

Commit

**$P \notin NP$**

# Quantum Cryptography

## Minicrypt

...

=)

OWF

⇓

PRSG

⌋

SKE

⇐

OWSG

=)

EFI pairs ( )

⇓

⇐

Commit ( )

OT ( )

MPC

Pseudo-entanglement



# Quantum Cryptography

## Minicrypt

...

=)

OWF

⇓

PRSG

⌋

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⇐

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=)

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## Minicrypt

...

=)

OWF

⇔

PRSG

⌋

SKE

⇐

OWSG

=)

EFI pairs

( )

Commit

( )

OT

( )

MPC

⇔

Pseudo-entanglement

QKD

# Classical vs. Quantum Cryptography

Impossibility of many *Information-Theoretic* protocols

*Classical (computational) cryptography*  $\Rightarrow$   $P \notin NP$

*Quantum resources*  $\Rightarrow$  weaker Commitments, OT, QKD, ...

Assume correctness of the *Laws of Physics*

*New computational world*: Quantum Cryptography, but no Classical Cryptography

How physics and computational hardness relate through cryptography?

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
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# Weaker Primitives

## One-Way Functions




*Pseudo-Random State Generator*

Efficient gen. (QPT):  $G_n(k) = |\psi_k\rangle$

Pseudo-random:  $G_n(k) \stackrel{p(n)}{\approx} |c_j H_i\rangle \stackrel{p(n)}{\approx}$


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
OWF  $\Rightarrow$  PRSG  
PRSG  $\not\Rightarrow$  (oracle red.) OWF

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## Pseudo-Random Generator



*Pseudo-Random State Generator*


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
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# EFI (quantum state) Pairs

Mixed  $n$ -qubit states  $\rho_0, \rho_1$

Efficiently preparable: QPT  $U_0, U_1$

statistically Far:  $\text{TD}(\rho_0, \rho_1) = 1 - \epsilon$

computationally Indistinguishable:  $\rho_0 \approx_c \rho_1$



EFI Pairs ( ) Commitments ( ) OT ( ) MPC



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EFI Pairs ( ) Commitments ( ) OT ( ) MPC



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

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

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## EFID(istribution) Pairs

Probability ensembles  $X = fX_n g_n, Y = fY_n g_n$

Efficiently constructible: PPT  $S_0, S_1$

$X_n$   $S_0(n)$

statistically Far:  $SD(X, Y) = 1 - \epsilon$

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EFID Pairs ( ) PRG ( ) OWF

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## Entanglement cost

Given  $\rho_{AB}$ ; use LOCC to prepare  $\rho_{AB}$

How many Bell pairs do they need?

$$E_C^\varepsilon(\rho_{AB}) = \inf \{ n \mid \exists \sigma_{AB} \in \mathcal{F}(\rho_{AB}; n) \text{ s.t. } \|\rho_{AB} - \sigma_{AB}\|_1 \leq \varepsilon \}$$

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Restrict LOCC operations to QPT

Computational entanglement cost:  $E_C^\varepsilon$

Computational distillable entanglement:  $E_D^\varepsilon$



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# Pseudo-Entanglement

$\psi_{AB}$ ,  $\phi_{AB}$   $n$ -qubit mixed states

$\psi_{AB}$  has low entanglement

$$E_C''(\psi_{AB}) \leq c(n)$$

$\phi_{AB}$  has high entanglement

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Computational ind.  $t = \text{poly}(n)$  copies

$$\psi_{AB}^{\otimes t} \stackrel{c}{\sim} \phi_{AB}^{\otimes t}$$

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EFID pair  $X = fX_n g_n$   $Y = fY_n g_n$

$B$  Bernoulli  $(\frac{1}{2})$

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# EFI Pairs $\Rightarrow$ Pseudo-Entanglement

Construction

EFI pair  $\rho_0, \rho_1$

$$\psi_{AB} = \frac{1}{4} (j + ih + j_{AB} + j - ih - j_{AB}) (\rho_{0A} + \rho_{1A})$$

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Proof (Cost of  $\rho_{AB}$ )

$$\psi_{AB} = \frac{1}{4} (|j_0\rangle + |ih_0\rangle + |j_{AB}\rangle + |j_1\rangle - |ih_1\rangle - |j_{AB}\rangle) (\rho_{0A} + \rho_{1A})$$

A flips fair coin, prepares  $\begin{cases} \rho_0 & \text{if } H \\ \rho_1 & \text{if } T \end{cases}$

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$$\text{TD}(\rho_0, \rho_1) = 1 - \varepsilon$$

Unbounded  $A$  distinguishes  $\rho_0, \rho_1$  and tells  $B$

$$\begin{cases} \rho_0 & \text{then } j + i_{AB} \\ \rho_1 & \text{then } j - i_{AB} \end{cases}$$

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# EFI Pairs $\Rightarrow$ Pseudo-Entanglement

Proof (  $\rho_{AB}$   $\rho_{AB}$  )

$$\text{Adv}_D(\rho_0, \rho_1) \leq \varepsilon \Rightarrow \text{Adv}_{D^0}(\psi_{AB}, \phi_{AB}) \leq \varepsilon^0$$

$$\begin{cases} D^0(j + ih + j, \rho_0) \text{ or } D^0(j - ih - j, \rho_1) \neq \psi_{AB}, \phi_{AB} \\ D^0(j + ih + j, \rho_1) \text{ or } D^0(j - ih - j, \rho_0) \neq \psi_{AB} \end{cases}$$

Distinguish  $\frac{1}{2}$  the times

$D^0$  can prepare  $\psi_{AB}$  and  $\phi_{AB}$  locally

$$\text{Adv}_{D^0}(\psi_{AB}, \phi_{AB}) \leq \frac{1}{2} \text{Adv}_D(\rho_0, \rho_1) < \varepsilon$$

$$\text{Adv}_{D^0}(\psi_{AB}^t, \phi_{AB}^t) \leq t\varepsilon$$

# EFI Pairs $\Rightarrow$ Pseudo-Entanglement

Proof (  $\rho_{AB}$   $\rho_{AB}$  )

$$\text{Adv}_D(\rho_0, \rho_1) < \varepsilon \Rightarrow \text{Adv}_{D^0}(\psi_{AB}, \phi_{AB}) < \varepsilon^0$$

$$\begin{cases} D^0(j + ih + j, \rho_0) \text{ or } D^0(j - ih - j, \rho_1) \neq \psi_{AB}, \phi_{AB} \\ D^0(j + ih + j, \rho_1) \text{ or } D^0(j - ih - j, \rho_0) \neq \psi_{AB} \end{cases}$$

Distinguish  $\frac{1}{2}$  the times

$D^0$  can prepare  $\psi_{AB}$  and  $\phi_{AB}$  locally

$$\text{Adv}_{D^0}(\psi_{AB}, \phi_{AB}) \leq \frac{1}{2} \text{Adv}_D(\rho_0, \rho_1) < \varepsilon$$

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# EFI Pairs $\Rightarrow$ Pseudo-Entanglement

Proof (amplification)

$$\bar{\psi}_{AB} = \bigotimes_{i=1}^q \psi_{AB}$$

$$\bar{\phi}_{AB} = \bigotimes_{i=1}^q \phi_{AB}$$

Error:

$$F(\rho^q, \sigma^q) = F(\rho, \sigma)^q \Rightarrow (1 - \epsilon)^q \geq 1 - q\epsilon$$

Swap:

$$\begin{cases} \bar{\psi}_{AB}^{\rho} = (\bigotimes_{i=1}^q \psi_{AB})^{\rho} = \bigotimes_{i=1}^q (\psi_{AB}^{\rho}) \\ \bar{\phi}_{AB}^{\rho} = (\bigotimes_{i=1}^q \phi_{AB})^{\rho} = \bigotimes_{i=1}^q (\phi_{AB}^{\rho}) \end{cases}$$

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